This paper explores the extent to which emissions limits on stack concentrations under the Large Combustion Plant (LCP) Directive succeeded in mitigating local air pollutants from thermal power stations in the European Union. We take advantage of the discontinuities in regulation status to show that the emission performance standards led to sizeable declines in concentrations of SO 2 , NOx, and particulate matter from the oldest fleet of combustion plants. We also find that the average response from the existing old plants was stronger than that from the relatively new existing fleet. Taking into account that new plants were not myopic in complying to the standards, we estimate the treatment effect close to the regulation discontinuity date -showing that more stringent performance standards were effective. Finally, those that opted-out were not more likely to retire than similar combustion plants that chose to comply with standards -some evidence of grandfathering-induced shutdown delays.
Fossil-fuel combustion for power generation is the largest source of global greenhouse gas emissions and also a significant common source of local air pollutants. In the European Union (EU), the energy production and distribution sector is one of the major emitters of toxic pollutants such as sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) and nitrogen oxides (NOx), which are known to damage ecosystems and detrimental to human health (EEA Report No 13/2017 on air quality). To regulate environmental damage by thermal power plants, the European Commission adopted a number of command-and-control (CAC) instruments 1 This paper offers the first policy impact assessment of the Large Combustion Plants directive on flue emissions rates from thermal combustion plants in the European Union 2 . The LCP directive set mandatory minimum EPS for SO 2 , NOx, and total particulate matter, which 1 CAC instruments are a direct form of regulation in which the regulator specifies a target or a standard that a firm, plant, or locality must achieve -or face non-compliance penalties. Between 1970 and 2011, over 50% of EU environmental policy instruments used were of the CAC type (regulatory, interventionist, and topdown), with emission limits and technical requirements playing the role of the top two (Schmitt and Schulze, 2011) . 2 This paper does not assess the compliance rate of individual plants or Member States covered under the LCP regulation. For a useful report on the subject of compliance, see Wynn and Coghe (2017) . They assess emission concentrations from the dirtiest coal-fired power plants in Europe and discuss the implications that the new round of emission limits under the EU's Industrial Emission Directive have on their operation decisions. applied to all combustion plants with a rated thermal input of 50 MW or more. We examine the following research questions in this paper: 1) How effective were the EPS under the LCP Directive in cleaning up emissions from the oldest existing stock of EU combustion plants? 2) To what extent were more stringent EPS, applied to newer plants, effective in reducing emissions intensity of regulated local air pollutants? 3) Did the opt-out policy actually encourage the old, large, and dirty combustion units to eventually close operations?
The key challenges in answering these questions are separating the effects of the LCP Directive from the 2008 economic crisis, the EU ETS, the National Emission Ceilings (NEC) Directive, the policy interaction with the Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) Directive, along with time-varying confounding factors leading to selection bias in estimating treatment effects. Notwithstanding, a number of regulation-specific factors makes the LCP Directive an ideal policy to study in order to understand the effectiveness of emission performance standards on the full population of combustion plants in the EU. First, the directive had three distinct regulation arms: Articles 4-1, 4-2, and 4-3. Regulation intensity was differentiated across plants based on the operation licensing dates -this allowed us to construct plausible counterfactuals and evaluate the effect of emission performance standards at both the extensive and intensive margins.
Second, the LCP directive differed from the usual vintage-differentiated regulation in the United States (see Stavins, 2006) , because it did not exempt older plants from any form of regulatory intervention. This allowed us to investigate the environmental performance of the oldest combustion plants in the European Union. All plants licensed before July 1987 were required under the provisions of Article 4-3 to either 1) take appropriate measures to achieve annual emissions concentrations established under Article 4-1, 2) be included under a national emission reduction plan (NERP), or 3) opt-out from emission limits values (ELV) to instead limit operation hours to 20,000 and be required to shut down by the end of 2015. We treat optout plants as the control group to estimate the effect on stack-level emission concentrations of older plants (Article 4-3) that chose to comply with new environmental standards (ELV treatment). Using difference-in-differences, we find that average SO 2 , NOx, and dust emission concentrations were 39%, 10%, and 25% lower respectively after the policy deadline. Furthermore, keeping the same counterfactual of opt-out plants, we find that emissions intensity of relatively newer plants under Article 4-1 did not change significantly (with the exception of SO 2 concentrations). Consequently, we argue that the response of the oldest fleet under Article 4(3) to emission standards was much stronger than that from Article 4(1) plants.
Third, the directive took the form of a typical CAC regulation in which the prescribed emission limits are more stringent for newly built plants than for (2) , to answer whether combustion plants subject to more stringent EPS were progressively cleaner due to the pol-icy. We find strong evidence that tighter standards prompted newer plants to reduce emission concentrations of local pollutants from 2004 to 2015.
To my knowledge, Meyer and Pac (2017) are the only ones to empirically explore the consequences of the LCPD regulation in the European Union. They focus on correlation rather than causation, however. Their results suggest that higher coal or lignite fuel input at power-generating plants was associated with a lower probability of opting out of the emissionrate standards applied to all combustion plants operating before 1987. 3 We seek to go beyond the analysis found in Meyer and Pac (2017) and analyze the LCP directive comprehensively.
In this paper, we pay critical attention to the performance of the oldest thermal combustion fleet (older than 1987) in the EU by comparing emissions concentrations of installations that opted-out to those that chose to comply with performance standards. We further explore that whether the LCPD created a perverse incentive for older stations to continue highly polluting operations without requiring performance standards. Those that opted out of the emission rate standards and eventually shutdown by the end of 2015 were more likely to be coal and lignite power plants. More importantly, these plants were not more likely to shutdown (as intended by the Article 4(3) requirements) than similar plants that chose to comply. This gives us some evidence that the LCP directive gave rise to the "old-plant" effect, deferring dirty plant shutdowns or replacements.
In the next section, we briefly review some empirical literature concerning air quality control using emission-rate standards. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3 provides a detailed description of the Large Combustion Plant Directive and other overlapping policies that were in force during the same regulation period. Section 4 describes the data from the EEA. Section 5 estimates the causal effect of emission standards under Articles 4(3) and 4(1), along with falsification tests. Section 6 investigates the policy impact of tighter standards under Article 4(2) taking potential anticipation effects seriously in the identification strategy.
In Section 7 we conduct more robustness checks. Section 8 investigates whether the old opt- 3 We have reason to be wary of this result: Considering that many of these combustion plants had multi-fuel input, I redo their analysis using plant-level input shares of fuel type (solid fuels, natural gas, liquid fuels, other gases, biomass) as predictor variables instead of absolute fuel inputs in petajoules. I find that relative to natural gas combustion, a higher share of coal, lignite, or liquid fuel was associated with an increased likelihood of being opted out of emission limits values -which is opposite of the result found in Meyer and Pac (2017) . This may imply that some operators of coal and lignite plants found that returns to eventual shutdown by the end of 2015 were higher than investing in costly retrofits to comply with the emission limits values in the LCPD.
out combustion plants were more likely to close than plants under different regulation regimes.
Lastly, Section 9 concludes.
Related Literature
In the last two decades, there has been a notable increase in research evaluating policy for environmental protection. The design of empirical studies emphasizes causal inference by comparing a group of regulated (treated) firms with a comparable (control) group of firms that were not subject to the treatment. As a result, we now have an improved perspective on the causal effects of environmental policy instruments that addresses industrial pollution. The literature evaluating the effectiveness of emission performance standards in non-EU countries, notably the United States, has been extensive.
A large majority of these studies use the spatial variation in the implementation of the US Clean Air Act (CAA) to evaluate the effect of air quality regulation under the CAA framework. As a result, many regulation categories of the Clean Air Act have come under empirical evaluation. Greenstone (2004) shows that by the end of 1970s most of the US counties were in compliance with the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for SO 2 concentrations. But the author finds that whether a county came under SO 2 regulation (nonattainment status) under the Clean Air Act did not play a major role in the improvement of ambient air quality for sulfur dioxide. While Chay and Greenstone (2003) demonstrate that total suspended particles (TSPs) pollution fell dramatically in the early 1970s and that these large changes in ambient TSPs concentrations were regulation induced. Henderson (1996) documents that nonattainment counties successfully reduced ozone concentrations relative to attainment counties. Nevertheless, the regulation may have had unintended and costly consequences due the non-uniform implementation of the environmental regulation across the US. Becker and Henderson (2000) and Henderson (1996) That is, the industries affected by the regulation slowly relocated their activities to areas that were less polluted (attainment counties) and therefore evaded regulation requirements to install the cleanest available technology. Harrison et al. (2015) investigate the effectiveness of the Indian Supreme Court Action Plans (SCAP) and price incentives via fuel taxes to reduce coal use and promote SO 2 pollution abatement technology. Using a comprehensive industrial plant-level dataset, they find that higher coal prices led to a significant reduction in coal use as an input into production across plants. However, they further find that the SCAP were only successful in targeting large highly polluting installations. Greenstone For the purposes of policy design, if the emission-rate or technology standards for regulated pollutants only apply to new rather than existing polluting sources, there is a concern that such a policy-exemption rule, often referred to as "grandfathering", could encourage the operation of plants that are older and dirtier over the longer run. One such policy is the New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) introduced under the 1970 Clean Air Act in the US. The NSPS featured emission-based standards for only new sources and mandated up to a 90% reduction in SO2 emissions from earlier pre-regulated levels. Empirical studies validate that the mandated investment in scrubbers increased operation costs of new plants, which led the operators to utilize older unregulated plants at higher capacity (Stavins, 2006) and delayed re-investment in existing plants to avoid triggering the Clean Air Act requirements (Bushnell and Wolfram 2012) . Although the LCP directive did not require stringent desulfurization or denitrification from the (older) existing polluting plants, it did nevertheless impose either lenient standards on the stack concentrations or limited operations. We will investigate the effectiveness of this specific design feature of the LCP directive in this paper.
Policy Context

Large Combustion Plant Directive
The LCP directive was first adopted by the European Council in 1988 5 , subsequently amended in 1994 6 , and then revised on the 23th October of 2001 7 . While the structure of regulation has more or less remained the same since initial implementation, the performance standards are stricter with each revision. The directive specifies upper limits for the emission intensity are referred to as "new-new" plants, subject to provisions under article 4(2) of the directive, and exposed to significantly more stringent regulations than the "old-new" plants or "existing" plants. Significant emission reductions were required from "existing plants" that were licensed before 1 July 1987 via either the national emission reduction plan (NERP) or meeting the emission limit values set for "old-new" plants under article 4(1). Existing power stations (older than 1987) could "opt-in" and be subject to lenient emission standards or "opt-out" and instead 8 In the analysis that follows, we seek to quantify the impact of emission rules on polluting behavior at the stack/plant level. Tables 1 to 3 summarize the performance standards stated as emission limit values for SO 2 , NOx, and particulates that were set to be achieved by January of 2008. The regulation intensity for each controlled pollutants varied depending on whether the plant would be eventually subject to article 4(1) or article 4(2) of the directive. As evident from the tables, new combustion plants regulated under article 4(2) have considerably tighter emission limit values (stricter compliance standards) than do older plants under article 4(1). Moreover, these performance standards varied by the type of fuel input (e.g. solid, liquid, or gaseous) and capacity of the plant as measured by thermal megawatt (MWth) input.
It is important to note that the directive applied not only to the electricity and heating sectors, but all thermal generation from large combustion units, irrespective of the sector.
This included, as a result, firms in the iron, steel, paper, sugar, chemicals, and rubber sectors generating power and heat onsite.
Potential Compliance Mechanisms
To comply with the directive, plant operators have a number of compliance options. In order to reduce emissions intensity, there could be (1) a change in the fuel-mix used, e.g. increase the 8 Note that there were comparable national programs (e.g. GFA-VO 1983 in Germany, and Dutch Bees WLV 1987 in Netherlands) in place, before the EU level LCP directive. We do not expect these older policies to bias our results as we have no reason to believe that they affect article 4-1 and article 4-1 plants differentially post-2007.
share of emission compliant fuels like natural gas, (2) installing and using pollutant abatement technology -e.g. retrofitting the plant with scrubber technology designed for each pollutant type to clean the flue gases, (3) increases in operational or fuel efficiency, (4) closure of noncompliant units or a change in the merit order (e.g. temporary production status or peak-use only). In the analysis, we find some evidence on what share of the compliance mechanism for old plants could be attributed to fuel-switching.
NEC targets & 2008
During the same (observable) regulation period, the European Parliament set national emission ceilings (NEC) for absolute emissions in kilotonnes for sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, volatile organic compounds and ammonia for each of 15 EU member states 9 . These targets were to be achieved between 1990 and 2010. However, these emissions targets were not sector-specific: that is, they could have been achieved cumulatively by reductions in the transport, agriculture, waste, commercial, energy production, and industrial sectors.
The analysis in this paper focuses only on the energy production and distribution sector, so it is likely that the threat to identification due to the NEC targets is low. Nevertheless, the reader may have residual concern that the NEC targets could bias the estimates for the LCP directive. This may be true if we have reason to believe that the NEC targets affected plants regulated under Articles 4(1) and 4(2) differentially. Similarly, NEC targets are a concern if opt-out plants reacted differently from plants that chose to comply with ELVs. We will seek to explain the impact of the LCP directive on stack-level emissions concentrations rather than absolute emissions, so NEC targets should not be a concern. Figure 2 shows that absolute emissions from the energy production and distribution sector fell at a much higher rate in 2008 and 2009, likely due to the great recession. It is all the more important therefore to focus the analysis on emissions intensity rather than absolute emissions to correctly estimate the impact of the LCP directive. To allay still any residual concerns, we will impose country-specific fixed effects in emissions intensity to capture possible confounding effects of the NEC regulation targets and year-specific fixed effects to pick up time-specific unobservables.
EU ETS
Generally, threats to identification exist if an event or unobservable factor affect emission concentrations from plants in the selected treatment and controls groups in a systematically different way and we are unable to control for it. Take for example the EU ETS, after conditioning on the size of the plant (GWth), we do not have a strong reason to believe that the trading market would confound our estimates of the impact of the LCP directive.
IPPC Directive
The IPPC directive (Directive 96/61/EC of 24 September 1996) is a major threat to identifying the response of new plants to lower pollutant limits values or stricter emission standards at the stack-level. This is because the IPPC directive required operating permits in compliance with best available techniques, including the standards in the LCP directive, for all new plants or those undergoing major changes starting 30 October 1999.
We therefore have strong reason to expect that the policy interaction between the LCP and IPPC directives made it harder to avoid compliance with emission performance standards under Article 4(1) or Article 4(2) for plants with operation dates starting 1999. We are still interested in quantifying the effect of more stringent environmental standards under Article 4(2) and will take anticipation into account in the research design.
Note that IPPC was not a requirement for units that started operating pre-1987 and therefore older plants had no incentive to comply pre-deadline of 2008. Moving forward, the Industrial Emissions Directive integrates the LCPD and the IPPC, along with other directives, in one comprehensive regulation.
Data
The data on all large combustion activities come from the European Environment Agency Table 6 for the industries covered.
The status of the plant under the LCP directive is central to the assessment of whether a combustion plant is in compliance with the regulation. However, Germany and Sweden do not report the regulation status of their combustion plants to the EEA. To circumvent this lack of information, we impute the regulation status using the start date of operation. Still, the information on the start date of operation is unavailable for all plants in the sample, and therefore we are unable to use all available data for Germany and Sweden in our estimations. Table 4 shows the breakdown of the number of plants by regulation status in each EU country, including where unknown.
Note that there were no combustion units that opted-out of emission-rate standards from Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Hungary, Croatia, Kosovo, Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia, Netherlands, and Sweden. Due to lack of control plants, we exclude these countries from the estimation sample when exploring the impact of emission standards on units regulated under Articles 4-3 and 4-1. Table 5 shows the breakdown of plants by regulation status for each member state with at least one opt-out combustion plant.
From Absolute Emissions to Emissions Intensity
The LCP regulation expresses the emission limit values in milligrams per cubic meter (mg per Nm 3 ). Since the EEA only provides absolute emissions of NOx, SO 2 , and particulate matter, as reported by the plants, we convert tonnes emissions into flow rates (mg per Nm 3 ). For the dependent variable, we combine information on raw fuel usage (in petajoules) with tonnes emissions to construct our outcome variable of interest, emissions intensity. To do this we need estimates of the flue rates associated with specific fuel types. We start with using flue rates assumptions provided in the study by Wynn et al. (2017) . We check whether our estimates are sensitive to assumptions involved in the calculation of the flue rates and this is not the case. We also conduct sensitivity analysis by defining emissions intensity as emissions divided by total fuel input -our results are strongly robust to this and quantitative conclusions remain the same. Table 7 shows pre-treatment differences in means for the key variables between those plants that opted-out versus those that chose to comply with emission limits under Article 4-3. and Article 4-1. The table suggests that on average opt-out plants were much larger in size (as measured by MWth), used boilers to combust, and used more solid fuels (excluding biomass) and liquid fuels as a share of the total energy input. On the other hand, plants that chose to comply with the emission limit values were on average using more gaseous fuels and biomass as a share of total energy input, and used gas turbine as combustion type.
Historic Trends in Emissions Intensity
Pre-treatment Statistics
We will control for the size of the plant and construct emission intensity using information on specific-fuel input and their associated flue rates. Using emissions intensity in mg/nM 3 as the dependent variable will allow us to capture the differences in the fuel mixes. Fuel-switching is one of the mechanisms using which plants seek to comply with emission-performance standards.
For this reason, we want to avoid controlling for time-varying plant-level fuel input such as fuel type shares to avoid post-treatment bias. Nevertheless, controlling for fuel input shares could inform us about how much of the compliance mechanism adopted by plants was due to fuel-switching. Table 8 presents pre-treatment differences in means for the key variables between plants regulated under Article 4(1) Article 4 (2) . The variables shown appear to be similar in distribution. Moreover, pre-treatment differences of these key variables are relatively stable across years as well (not shown here).
Emissions Control Under Articles 4(3) and 4(1)
Research Design
In an ideal research setting we would have that the policy treatment was randomly assigned to plants such that regulatory status was independent of all possible factors affecting plant-level emissions -this is not the case. Moreover, we do not have emissions data on plants that were not regulated under the directive, i.e. all combustion plants with a capacity less than 50MWth.
To construct plausible counterfactuals, we look in the implementation details of the regulation across the set of plants under regulation. We take advantage of the variation across the three vintage-differentiated regulatory arms of the directive to assess the impact of emission performance standards. To investigate the effect of EPS on EU combustion plants (extensive margin), we use a difference-in-differences (DiD) framework. We treat plants that opted-out as the control group and plants that chose to meet the emission-rates under Article 4-3 and 
where we expect the regulation to be in effect during the period from 2008 to 2015 for units To account for the considerable heterogeneity (unevenness) in the implementation of the LCPD policy across countries (for example, compliance stringency was left to the member states), we use regulation-specific linear trends (δ rc × t) that are allowed to vary by country.
This is in addition to the country-specific fixed effects to allow for time-varying differences in the policy environments across countries. Note that we do not control for fuel-type shares in our preferred estimation equation, because it would lead to post-treatment estimation bias. This is because fuel-switching (e.g. substituting natural gas for other fossil-fuels, particularly coal)
is an important option for thermal operators to meet the requirements of the LCP directive.
Identifying Assumptions
Here we will address the main identifying assumptions. Due to the fixed effects, the identifica- It is absolutely necessary that the control and treated groups have common trends in emissions intensity, before the policy deadline. For us to interpret β as the causal effect of emission performance standards, we require that the emissions intensity outcomes of treated plants would have followed similar trends to those of the control plants in absence of treatment. It
is not possible to test this directly, but we provide graphs and placebo tests to diagnose this. Note that these graphs are limited to those member states that had opt-out plants.
Results -EPS for Article 4(3) Plants
We estimate the effect of emission-rate standards under Article 4(3) in Tables 9 to 11 . For identification we limit the sample to countries that had at any opt-out plants -we call them opt-out member states. These are 17 EU countries, with a total of 241 plants opting out of emission standards (see Table 5 ). We also exclude plants that were using a gas or diesel engine because the LCP directive did not apply to them. Column (2) introduces industry by year fixed effects to capture any developments that may be unique to the industry. From Columns (3) and (4), we can see that the estimates for NOx are sensitive to the inclusion of any country-related fixed effects or trends. This is not as apparent in Tables 10 and 11 , where we run the same models for SO 2 and particulate matter. Columns (4) shows estimates of equation (1), which is our preferred specification, and further controls for regulation-specific linear trends that are common to each member state. In Table 9 , we see a negative change in NOx emission concentrations of about 11%, but the estimate is significant only at the 10% level.
To allay concerns that the differences in the distribution of covariates concerning fuel usage are driving the results, we add fuel controls in Column 5. The difference in the estimates from Columns 4 to 5 provide some indication of the importance of fuel-switching for older plants due to the emission-rate standards. In Table 9 , after controlling for fuel input shares in Column 5, the coefficient on 4(3) ELV treatment is four percentage points (or 38%) lower than in Column 4. And this estimate is no longer statistically significant -suggesting that fuel-switching was on average a strong compliance mechanism for NOx abatement, than say retrofitting.
In Tables 8 
Falsification Test
To conduct falsification tests, we use years 2006 and 2007 as hypothetical policy deadlines for compliance to the LCP directive. We do not expect anticipation to play any significant role for old plants complying with the emission standards: (1) because of high costs for plant operators to retrofit older plants or enhance operational efficiency, and (2) because IPPC was not a requirement for combustion units that started operating pre-1999 and therefore majority of older plants had no incentive to comply before the 2008 compliance deadline.
Since all plants regulated under Article 4(3) and most under Article did not have any other regulatory requirements (e.g. in the IPPC directive), we assume away the possibility of detecting anticipation prior to 2008. We consider therefore this to be a strong test for common trends, in addition to the visual checks in Figure 4 . We stick to the preferred specification in equation (1) -the inclusion of fuel controls do not change the result -and the results are presented in Table 12 .
As expected, the estimated effects on plant-level emission concentrations before the compliance deadline of 2008, for all three pollutants, are statistically insignificant. On the other hand, estimates in the second row could be an indication that the response was already taking effect after 2006 -inconclusive, however.
Results -EPS for Article 4(1) Plants
We conduct the identical exercise to estimate the effect of emission-rate standards under Article 4(1) in Table 13 . Again, for identification we have limited the sample to opt-out member states only. We find that combustion units regulated under Article 4(1) were prompted to reduce SO 2 emission intensity by 31% under the lenient performance standards. For the other two pollutants under consideration, the effect was statistically insignificant.
In contrast to the observed response by Article 4(3) seen in Table 12 , Table 13 suggests that the emission limits values under Article 4(1) were perhaps too lenient. This is not surprising as we see in the right column of Figure 4 6 Emissions Control Under Article 4(2)
Research Design
Now we turn to estimating the effect of tighter emission limits imposed under the LCP directive.
We would like to identify the effect of tighter standards on new plants from the change in emission intensities of Article 4(2) units compared with the change in emission intensities of Article 4(1) units. We are unable to exploit the D-I-D framework applied thus far because we expect anticipation to play a role for the following reasons:
• Plants getting operation permits after the LCP directive was announced in 2001 would be already aware of the emission standards required. If plant operators have prior access to information on future compliance requirements and are reasonably forward-lookingwe expect them to invest early.
• New plants, as opposed to old existing plants, using newer combustion technology would find it relatively cheaper to invest early (possibly also costly to delay).
• As discussed in Section 3.5, the IPPC directive required new units and those undergoing "substantial changes" to meet technology standards starting 30 October 1999. We expect therefore plants starting operations after 1998 to be more forward-looking (less myopic) in adhering to EPS requirements. Figure 5 shows that the requirement of common trends does not hold because trends in emissions intensity of article 4(1) plants differ significantly from that of article 4(2) plants during the pre-treatment period, most notably for NOx. In light of the policy interaction between IPPC and LCP directives, we find it difficult to rule out anticipation as one of the explanations for the significant declines in emission intensities of NOx and SO 2 by all plants affected by IPPC before the LCPD deadline -see the right column of Figure 5 .
To circumvent the problem of anticipation, we do the following:
• We assume that the regulation assignment rule was arbitrary (plants staring operation after 2002 came under Article 4(2)) and that it was difficult for plants to "game the system." Given this assumption, the regulation status for plants just before and after 2003 is as good as random. Therefore, plants near the cutoff date are similar in unobservable characteristics that affect emission concentrations at the stack-level. The closer to the cutoff date, the stronger our identification assumption -although not rigorously testable.
We will control for all possible time-varying and observable plant variables and also impose combustion type fixed effects.
• We do not impose any policy deadline. We compare the performance of the treated versus control plants during the full observed period of 2004 to 2015.
We estimate the following equation for plants near the cutoff date of 2003:
where y pt is the log emission intensity of pollutant of interest. S p = 1 indicates whether the plant came under stringent EPS under Article 4 (2) . The base category is EPS under Article 4(1). X pt captures plant-level operations such as fuel input shares by fuel type and plant capacity in GWth. η m are fixed effects for combustion type. θ ct and φ it country and industry fixed effects allowed to vary by year.
Results
Tables 14, 15, and 16 estimate equation (2) for emission intensities of NOx, ceSO2, and dust respectively. We use plants that started operations either 2003 and 2004 as the treated group.
Columns (1) and (2) 
Further Robustness Checks
Here we address the possibility that results discussed in the previous sections are due to another factor that we may have not considered.
Alternative Treatment and Control Groups
It is important to show that the results are robust to alternative treatment and control groups.
The reader might be worried that it is simply that newer plants are cleaner than the older ones -that a remaining confounding factor might be newer technology. We expect that plant vintage or time-invariant fuel-technology should be captured by the plant-fixed effects and time variables already. Nevertheless, we rerun the estimations using Article 4-1 as the treatment regulation, and for the control group we use Article 4-3 plants that chose to comply with Article 4-1 standards. Both groups were subject to identical emission limit values. Then the difference between these two groups should not be the regulation, but rather improvements in technology over time. Once we control for plant-fixed effects, we do not expect to find Article 4(1) plants to respond on average more than those under Article 4(3) -especially since Article 4(1) plants were already on average cleaner than the older plants. Table 18 confirms this and demonstrates that there are no significant differences in emission intensities of local pollutants between the treatment and control groups. These results provide further assurance that we are correctly attributing the effects we find to emission performance standards under the LCP directive.
Shutdown of Grandfathered Plants
In this section we will explore whether the old and dirty opt-out plants were "grandfathered" under the LCP directive. Under Article 4(3), opt-out plants avoided environmental standards, but were supposed to limit operating hours to 20,000 and close by the end of 2015. Did this happen? shutdown decision using the full EEA dataset in a linear probability model:
where 4(3) p = 1, 4(1) p = 1, and 4(2) p = 1 indicate that the combustion unit was subject to We estimate this linear probability model by ordinary least squares in Table 19 for both the full sample and then again limiting the estimation sample to only opt-out member states. The results reveal that opt-out plants were more likely to shutdown during the policy period than newer combustion plants complying to emission rate standards under Article 4(1) and 4 (2) .
But surprisingly opt-out plants did not close more often than those of similar age under Article 4 (3) . Given the estimates are stable across the two samples, we have confidence about the robustness of our qualitative findings. We find evidence in this section that the LCP directive "grandfathered" the oldest and dirtiest power stations and allowed them to keep running over the long run.
Conclusion
Effective pollution control in the complex regulatory context of the European Union is an im- The results are robust to a range of specifications and falsification tests, so that we can be confident that we are accurately attributing the findings to variations in emission limits values under the Large Combustion Plant directive. Overall, evidence from this empirical study in this paper suggests that the LCP directive was an effective instrument in pollution abatement at the stack-level.
Whether the LCP directive created a perverse incentive for older power stations to continue highly polluting operations remains an empirical question. A uniform policy with respect to plant vintage is more likely to encourage investment by incumbents towards cleaner equipment earlier in the regulation period. The "grandfathering" convention was partially present in the LCP directive, because it allowed a large share of older installations to continue operations without requiring stringent emission-rate standards. Although politically more feasible, this had the potential to worsens pollution over the longer-run by encouraging the operation of power stations that are older and dirtier. Those that opted out of emission rate standards and eventually shutdown by the end of 2015 were more likely to be coal and lignite power plants.
Furthermore, these plants were not more likely to shutdown (as intended by the Article 4(3)
requirements) than similar plants that chose to comply with standards. This gives us some evidence that the LCP directive gave rise to the "old-plant" effect, deferring plant shutdowns or replacements that would otherwise be crucial for environment protection.
Given that we find that plants under Notes: The dependent variable is the log of emissions intensity (mg/nM 3 ). We use the date of starting operation to impute the regulation status of DE and SE combustion plants. The sample is limited to EU countries with opt-out plants under Article 4(3) . Combustion plants that were licensed post-January 1987 are not included in the analysis. We also exclude plants that were using a gas or diesel engine. Size control is the size of the plant in GWth. Fuel controls include the fuel input share of solid, biomass, liquid, other gases, and natural gas (%). The total number of clusters/plants used in estimation were 1283. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the plant level and robust to heteroskedasticity. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. (3) . Combustion plants that were licensed post-January 1987 are not included in the analysis. We also exclude plants that were using a gas or diesel engine. Size control is the size of the plant in GWth. Fuel controls include the fuel input share of solid, biomass, liquid, other gases, and natural gas (%). The total number of clusters/plants used in estimation were 1170. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the plant level and robust to heteroskedasticity. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. (3) . Combustion plants that were licensed post-January 1987 are not included in the analysis. We also exclude plants that were using a gas or diesel engine. Size control is the size of the plant in GWth. Fuel controls include the fuel input share of solid, biomass, liquid, other gases, and natural gas (%). The total number of clusters/plants used in estimation were 1107. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the plant level and robust to heteroskedasticity. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. (3) . Combustion plants that were licensed post-January 1987 are not included in the analysis. We exclude plants that were using a gas or diesel engine. Size control is the size of the plant in GWth. Fuel controls include the fuel input share of solid, biomass, liquid, other gases, and natural gas (%). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the plant level and robust to heteroskedasticity. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Notes: The dependent variable is the log of emissions intensity (mg/nM 3 ). We use the date of starting operation to impute the regulation status of DE and SE combustion plants. The sample is limited to EU countries with opt-out plants under Article 4(3). We exclude plants that were using a gas or diesel engine. Size control is the size of the plant in GWth. Fuel controls include the fuel input share of solid, biomass, liquid, other gases, and natural gas (%). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the plant level and robust to heteroskedasticity. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Notes: The dependent variable is the log of emissions intensity, defined either as emissions per energy input unit (kilotonnes per petajoule) or mg/nM 3 . We exclude plants that were using a gas or diesel engine. Size control is the size of the plant in GWth. Fuel controls include the fuel input share of solid, biomass, liquid, other gases, and natural gas (%). Combustion FE are capturing the type of combustion plant (boiler, gas turbine, furnace, etc). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country-by-year level and robust to heteroskedasticity. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Notes: The dependent variable is the log of emissions intensity, defined either as emissions per energy input unit (kilotonnes per petajoule) or mg/nM 3 . We exclude plants that were using a gas or diesel engine. Size control is the size of the plant in GWth. Fuel controls include the fuel input share of solid, biomass, liquid, other gases, and natural gas (%). Combustion FE are capturing the type of combustion plant (boiler, gas turbine, furnace, etc). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country-by-year level and robust to heteroskedasticity. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Notes: The dependent variable is the log of emissions intensity, defined either as emissions per energy input unit (kilotonnes per petajoule) or mg/nM 3 . We exclude plants that were using a gas or diesel engine. Size control is the size of the plant in GWth. Fuel controls include the fuel input share of solid, biomass, liquid, other gases, and natural gas (%). Combustion FE are capturing the type of combustion plant (boiler, gas turbine, furnace, etc). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country-by-year level and robust to heteroskedasticity. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Notes: The dependent variable is the log of emissions intensity (mg/nM 3 ). We use the date of starting operation to impute the regulation status of DE and SE combustion plants. We exclude plants that were using a gas or diesel engine. Size control is the size of the plant in GWth. Fuel controls include the fuel input share of solid, biomass, liquid, other gases, and natural gas (%). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the plant level and robust to heteroskedasticity. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 (2). The dependent variable is a binary variable (1 or 0) indicating whether the plant was closed by the end of the reporting year. We assume that plant was shutdown, if it was not reported to the EEA the next year. Operation controls consist of the size of the plant in GWth and absolute energy input in petajoules. Fuel controls include the fuel input share of solid, biomass, liquid, other gases, and natural gas (%). Emissions intensity controls for emission intensities of the three local pollutants considered in this paper. NERP is a dummy variable if the plant was part of the National Emission Reduction Plan. Combustion FE are capturing the type of combustion plant (boiler, gas turbine, furnace, etc). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the plant level and robust to heteroskedasticity. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
